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Abstract
Background: Neuraminidase inhibitors (NI) and social distancing play a major role in plans to
mitigate future influenza pandemics.
Methods: Using the freely available program InfluSim, the authors examine to what extent NI-
treatment and prophylaxis promote the occurrence and transmission of a NI resistant strain.
Results: Under a basic reproduction number of R0 = 2.5, a NI resistant strain can only spread if its
transmissibility (fitness) is at least 40% of the fitness of the drug-sensitive strain. Although NI drug
resistance may emerge in treated patients in such a late state of their disease that passing on the
newly developed resistant viruses is unlikely, resistant strains quickly become highly prevalent in
the population if their fitness is high. Antiviral prophylaxis further increases the pressure on the
drug-sensitive strain and favors the spread of resistant infections. The authors show scenarios
where pre-exposure antiviral prophylaxis even increases the number of influenza cases and deaths.
Conclusion: If the fitness of a NI resistant pandemic strain is high, any use of prophylaxis may
increase the number of hospitalizations and deaths in the population. The use of neuraminidase
inhibitors should be restricted to the treatment of cases whereas prophylaxis should be reduced
to an absolute minimum in that case.
Background
Neglecting the possible emergence of NI resistance, mod-
eling studies have suggested that an influenza pandemic
may be contained if treatment and prophylaxis are intro-
duced immediately [1-3]. Switzerland has stockpiled suf-
ficient NI to treat 25% of the population and considers
using some of the stockpile for prophylaxis in health care
workers and essential services (fire brigade, police, etc). As
influenza viruses mutate constantly, widespread use of
antivirals in the case of a pandemic could cause selection
pressure which could lead to the emergence and spread of
NI resistant strains. De novo emergence of a resistant strain
does not necessarily cause negative outcomes; it is the
transmission fitness of the resistant strain which plays a
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major role [4-7]. Simulation studies on HIV [8] and HSV-
2 [9] have also shown the important role of transmissibil-
ity in driving the dynamics of drug resistance. Influenza
resistant strains that show nearly the same transmission
fitness as wild type strains have been detected [10]. Also,
data from the European system VIRGIL show, that a NI
resistant seasonal influenza A (H1N1) strain circulates in
several countries [11]. NI resistance leads to treatment
failures and thus, to an increased number of hospitaliza-
tions and deaths attributable to influenza. As antiviral
prophylaxis and treatment are relevant for future interven-
tions against influenza, understanding the implications of
NI resistance and the dynamics of its spread is essential.
We examine how NI treatment and prophylaxis contrib-
ute to the emergence and circulation of NI resistant strains
and to changes in the epidemiology of infection.
Methods
We extend the freely available deterministic simulation
program  InfluSim  by including the emergence and the
spread of NI resistance [12]. InfluSim version 2.2 distin-
guishes drug sensitive and resistant infections, and allows
for prophylaxis [13].
We employ a basic reproduction number of R0 = 2.5 [14],
and assume that one third of all infected individuals
remain asymptomatic, that another third becomes mod-
erately sick and that the remaining third becomes severely
sick and seeks medical help (Fig. 1). A proportion of
severely sick cases needs hospitalization and may die from
the disease, depending on the age and on the risk group of
the patient (see Additional file 1, Table A1). Adults who
develop severe disease are sick and contagious for 7 days
on average and need 5 more days to recover before they
can resume work. Treatment reduces their remaining
duration of the disease by 25%, their contagiousness by
80% [2] and their need of hospitalization (and concur-
rently their risk of death) by 50% [15]. A fraction of the
population between 20 and 60 years of age is offered anti-
viral prophylaxis. We assume that people who take proph-
ylaxis are less susceptible to the infection with the drug
sensitive strain (the standard value of 50% is varied in an
uncertainty analysis). If they are infected, twice as many of
them remain asymptomatic than without prophylaxis;
their contagiousness, their duration of being sick and their
need for hospitalization are reduced in the same way as
described above for therapeutic treatment. We further-
more assume that only half of the individuals who take
prophylaxis become immune after asymptomatic infec-
tion whereas the other half is left susceptible (Fig. 1).
Simulations start with a single drug sensitive infection in
a Swiss population of 100,000 inhabitants. We assume
that 4.1% of children up to 12 years of age and 0.32% of
teenagers and adults infected with the drug sensitive virus
develop a NI resistant infection if they take antiviral drugs
[16,17]. The probability that they pass on the resistant
virus to others is small, as on average their contagiousness
has already decreased considerably before the resistant
virus appears. This is because (i) patients seek medical
treatment on average 24 hours after onset of symptoms,
(ii) their contagiousness is assumed to decline exponen-
tially over time with 90% of the total infectiousness being
spent within the first half of the infectious period, and
(iii) if de novo NI resistance occurs in a patient, it occurs at
a random time point between treatment and the end of
contagiousness. The resistant virus can have a reduced
transmissibility (fitness) compared to the drug-sensitive
strain, while having the same pathogenicity, causing the
same natural history of disease and inducing the same
degree of immunity, but cases infected with the NI resist-
ant virus no longer respond to antiviral drugs. Simula-
tions are performed for a variety of parameter values: The
fitness of the NI resistant strain is varied from 80 to 100%.
Course of disease Figure 1
Course of disease. Model assumptions on the course of 
disease of cases with and without prophylaxis if people are 
infected with the drug sensitive virus. Without prophylaxis, 
one third of infected individuals remains asymptomatic, one 
third becomes moderately sick and one third becomes 
severely sick and needs medical help. Prophylaxis halves the 
fractions of moderately and severely sick individuals and dou-
bles the fraction of infected individuals who remain asympto-
matic, but only half of the asymptomatic infections lead to 
protective immunity.
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The percentage of adults between 20 and 60 years of age
who receive prophylaxis is varied from 0 to 20%. Prophy-
laxis is assumed to reduce the susceptibility of the recipi-
ent by 50% (varied in an uncertainty analysis from 0 to
100%). Fifty percent of prophylactically treated individu-
als who experience asymptomatic infection become
immune after clearing the infection (varied in an uncer-
tainty analysis from 0 to 100%). We run simulations with
and without prophylaxis, with and without resistance,
and observe the total number of hospitalizations due to
severe influenza and the total work loss for people who
receive prophylaxis. No ethics committee was required to
grant permission for this investigation.
Results
Simulation results
Figures 2a–c show how the prevalence of infection with
the drug sensitive and the resistant virus change during
the pandemic wave if all severe cases are treated with NI
and if additionally 0%, 10% or 20% of the people
between 20 and 60 years of age receive prophylaxis
(assuming that the fitness of the NI resistant strain is as
high as that of the drug-sensitive one, i.e. 100%). The sim-
ulations start with one drug-sensitive infection in a sus-
ceptible population of 100,000 individuals. NI resistance
develops de novo and gradually builds up during the epi-
demic wave. If no prophylaxis is given, the drug-sensitive
strain dominates most of the epidemic wave (full curve)
and the resistant strain (dashed curve) only becomes prev-
alent in the end (Fig. 2a).
Prophylaxis increases the pressure on the drug sensitive
strain and favors the transmission of the resistant strain.
The prevalence of the NI resistant strain increases consid-
erably if 10% of all people between 20 and 60 years of age
are given prophylaxis (Fig. 2b). If the prophylaxis cover-
age is increased to 20%, the resistant strain very quickly
dominates the epidemic wave and the majority of cases
are infected with the resistant strain (Fig. 2c). With
increasing prophylaxis coverage, the peak number of
infected individuals increases from 17,000 to 25,000 and
the total number of infected individuals increases from
62,000 to 72,000 (Figs. 2a–c).
Individuals who are infected with the NI resistant strain
do not respond to antiviral treatment. Even without any
prophylaxis in the population, 13.7% of all treated
patients are treated in vain due to resistant infection. This
fraction increases to 43.4% and 74.5%, respectively, if
10% or 20% receive prophylaxis.
The joint influence of antiviral prophylaxis and fitness of
the resistant strain is shown in Figs. 3a–c. We assume that
during the whole course of the epidemic 0 to 20% of peo-
ple between 20 to 60 years of age receive prophylaxis. Fit-
ness of the resistant virus is varied from 80 to 100%
(simulations with lower fitness values yield results which
are very similar to the 80% scenario). Antiviral prophy-
laxis increases the number of treatment failures in the
population (Fig. 3a). If the fitness of the resistant strain is
less than 80%, this effect may be regarded as negligible,
but for higher fitness values and notably for a combina-
tion of high fitness and large prophylaxis coverage, the
results become increasingly pessimistic. If the fitness of
the resistant strain is below 88%, a low coverage of antivi-
ral prophylaxis can lead to a slightly smaller number of
hospitalizations, whereas for larger fitness values, the
expected number of hospitalizations grows with growing
prophylaxis coverage. In the case of 100% fitness, the
expected number of hospitalizations grows from 314 per
100,000 (without prophylaxis) to 516 (20% receive
prophylaxis). Apart from hoping that the population may
benefit from antiviral prophylaxis via herd effects, the
main goal of giving prophylaxis may be to maintain the
work force of first responders. The expected work loss per
person can approximately be calculated as follows: omit-
ting antiviral treatment and prophylaxis, we expect about
75% of the population to become infected. One third of
the infected individuals becomes severely sick for an aver-
age of 7 days and needs a further 5 days to recover. In
total, 25% of all working adults should, therefore, be out
of work for 12 days, i.e. we expect an average sickness
related work loss of 3 days per person in this scenario. This
value is further reduced by therapeutic antiviral treatment,
partly because treated individuals recover more quickly,
but more importantly because treatment prevents the
transmission of infection and thereby has a beneficial
herd effect. If all severe cases are treated, the expected
work loss per person drops to 2.1 days if no NI resistance
develops or if the NI resistant strain has a low fitness (with
de novo development of a highly transmissible resistant
strain, the expected work loss is only reduced to 2.4 days).
As a reference value, the expected work loss per person
without prophylaxis is depicted as grey horizontal bar in
Fig. 3c. Values below the grey bar indicate that people who
receive prophylaxis have a benefit, values above indicate
that their work loss is higher than what would have been
expected if nobody had received prophylaxis. If only few
people receive prophylaxis, their work loss can be less
than half of the value without prophylaxis, especially if
the fitness of the resistant strain is low. For strains with a
fitness of less than 92%, up to 20% may benefit from
prophylaxis. For strains with higher fitness, the expected
work loss can be worse than without prophylaxis if 10%
or more receive prophylaxis.
Uncertainty analyses
In the following, we investigate the influence of parameter
uncertainty by systematically varying the values of two
unknown parameters:BMC Infectious Diseases 2009, 9:4 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/9/4
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Figure 2 (see legend on next page)
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(a) The susceptibility to infection xsus of people who take
prophylaxis is varied from 0 to 100% (baseline value
50%). The results only deviate from the values shown in
Figs. 3a–b by up to 1240 treatment failures and by up to
21 hospitalizations per 100,000 inhabitants (with a slight
tendency towards higher deviations for combinations of
high prophylaxis coverage and high fitness values). The
parameter xsus strongly influences the expected work loss
of people who take prophylaxis. If only few people take
prophylaxis (cf. Fig. 3c), the expected work loss varies
between nearly 0 days (xsus = 0) and 1.2 days (xsus = 1) for
low fitness values, and from 0.9 to 1.6 days for high fitness
values. If 10% of the population between 20 and 60 years
of age take prophylaxis, the expected work loss varies from
0.1 day (xsus = 0) and 1.1 days (xsus = 1) for low fitness val-
ues, and it is about 2.2 days (irrespective of xsus) for high
fitness values.
(b) The fraction ximm of asymptomatic cases who develop
protective immunity if they have received prophylaxis, is
varied from 0 to 100% (baseline value 50%). The results
only deviate from the values shown in Figs. 3a–c by up to
240 treatment failures, by up to 7 hospitalizations and by
up to 0.1 days of work loss per person.
Quick calculation formula of the critical fitness of the 
resistant strain
The basic reproduction number R0 is the expected number
of people who are infected by a single index case in a fully
susceptible population where no interventions are taken.
If part of the population is immune and if interventions
are taken, we talk about the effective reproduction
number: the effective reproduction number   of the
drug sensitive strain and that of the NI resistant strain
( ) can be approximated as follows:
Here, s is the susceptible fraction of the population, rSD is
the reduction of transmission due to social distancing, riso
is the reduction due to case isolation, rtr is the reduction of
transmission due to antiviral treatment of cases, rpro is the
fraction of the population protected by prophylaxis and f
is the fitness of the resistant strain (for more details, see
the additional file SupplementaryData.doc). An infection
can only be transmitted if the effective reproduction
number is larger than 1. For the NI resistant strain,   is
larger than 1 if the fitness f is larger than (R0s (1- rSD)(1 -
riso))-1. In a fully susceptible population (s = 1) where no
interventions are performed (rSD = riso = 0), the fitness f
must be larger than   = 40%. Immunity in the popula-
tion and contact reductions increase the critical value of f.
NI resistance only becomes a problem if the resistant
strain spreads more efficiently than the drug sensitive one,
i.e. if  . This is the case if f > (1 - rtr)(1 - rpro).
Note that the critical value of f is independent of contact
reduction measures; it only depends on the effects of treat-
ment and prophylaxis. If the overall treatment effect is rtr
= 0.188 (see additional file SupplementaryData.doc), the
critical fitness of the resistant strain is about 81% if no
prophylaxis is given. If the fitness exceeds this value, the
resistant strain will invariably take over. The critical value
for the fitness drops to 73% and 65%, respectively, if 10%
or 20% of the population receive prophylaxis.
Discussion
Although NI resistant viruses may emerge de novo in
treated patients in such a late state of their course of dis-
Re
sens
Re
res
RR s r r r r
RR s r
e
sens
SD iso tr pro
e
res
SD
≈− −−−
≈−
0
0
111 1
11
() () ( ) ()
() ( − − rf iso)
Re
res
R0
1 −
RR e
res
e
sens >
Prevalence of infection Figure 2 (see previous page)
Prevalence of infection. Prevalence of people infected with the drug sensitive virus (solid lines), the drug resistant one 
(dashed lines) and the sum of both (dotted lines). All cases who seek medical help receive antiviral treatment; additionally, a 
fraction of (a) 0%, (b) 10% and (c) 20% of all adults between 20 and 60 years of age are given prophylaxis. The grey curves and 
the right hand scales indicate the fractions of resistant infections among all infections. Assumptions: (1) A single drug-sensitive 
infection is introduced on day 0 into a Swiss population of 100,000 individuals. (2) Resistance develops de novo in 4.1% of chil-
dren and 0.32% of adults who receive medication. (3) Social distancing reduces the number of contacts by 10% for all individu-
als; isolation additionally prevents 10%, 20% and 30% of contacts of moderately sick cases, severely sick cases at home, and 
hospitalized cases, respectively. (4) Antiviral treatment reduces the contagiousness of patients by 80%, their duration of sick-
ness by 25% and their need of hospitalization by 50% if they are infected with the drug sensitive virus. (5) Prophylaxis further-
more reduces susceptibility by 50%. Upon infection, it doubles the fraction of individuals who stay asymptomatic from one 
third to two thirds, but only one of the two thirds becomes immune. (6) R0 = 2.5 for the drug sensitive and the drug resistant 
virus (fitness = 100%).BMC Infectious Diseases 2009, 9:4 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/9/4
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ease that most patients may not pass on the infection, our
simulation study shows that the resistant strain will
become highly prevalent in the population if its relative
fitness is high and if NI treatment or prophylaxis are com-
mon. Prior to the 2007/8 influenza season, NI resistant
strains were only infrequently found in patients after
treatment with oseltamivir and in patients not exposed to
oseltamivir. Early surveillance data from the 2007/8 influ-
enza season on the northern hemisphere suggest that an
oseltamivir resistant influenza virus type A (H1N1) circu-
lates in several European countries and in North America
[6,7,11]. Resistance infections have been reported from
over two third of the countries which have implemented
an influenza surveillance system and test for antiviral
resistance. Furthermore, the proportion of resistant infec-
tions has become alarmingly high (between 4% and 70%)
in the afflicted countries. Even in a fully susceptible pop-
ulation, a resistant virus can only spread if its fitness
exceeded 40%. The populations in which the resistant sea-
sonal influenza virus is spreading are far from being sus-
ceptible which further increases the minimum fitness of
the resistant strain.
Considering the growing prevalence of resistant infections
in spite of extremely low treatment rates, the fitness of the
current resistant strain must indeed be very high. It is con-
ceivable that a pandemic influenza strain may also
become resistant without a considerable loss of transmis-
sibility although this may be regarded as a worst case sce-
nario. In a pandemic scenario, NI treatment is one of the
major means of intervention and will be used extensively.
Containing a potential pandemic within the country of its
origin by widespread antiviral prophylaxis has been sug-
gested [1,3]. Prophylaxis has also been considered for
local interventions after the international spread of the
pandemic virus.
Even in the optimistic scenario where a drug sensitive
infection is introduced into a population, de novo develop-
ment of NI resistance in treated patients and the ensuing
spread of resistant infections may lead to an early pre-
dominance of a resistant strain (Figs. 2a–c). De novo devel-
Figure 3
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Influence of antiviral prophylaxis Figure 3
Influence of antiviral prophylaxis. Influence of antiviral 
prophylaxis and of the fitness of the resistant strain on a pan-
demic wave in a population of 100,000 individuals into which 
a single nonresistant infection is introduced on day 0 (devel-
opment of resistance and other details see Fig. 2 and text). 
The horizontal axis shows what percentage of the population 
between 20 and 60 years of age receives prophylaxis; the 
numbers 80 ... 100 in the graphs indicate the fitness of the 
resistant strain. Simulations with lower fitness values lead to 
curves which are nearly identical to the 80% fitness curves. 
The results are given as (a) total number of treatment fail-
ures due to drug resistance; (b) total number of hospitaliza-
tions; (c) expected duration of work loss per ESW (essential 
service worker), i.e. per person who receives prophylaxis. 
Even without any prophylaxis in the population, the average 
work loss per person is slightly modified by the fitness of cir-
culating resistant virus (because of treatment in the popula-
tion). The grey horizontal bar shows the range of work loss 
per person which must be expected without prophylaxis 
(whereby the lower values in the grey area refer to low fit-
ness and the high ones to high fitness values).BMC Infectious Diseases 2009, 9:4 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/9/4
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opment of resistance in a person is a stochastic event and
would demand for stochastic simulation in order to real-
istically describe the variability in the timing of such an
event. Deterministic models like InfluSim only represent
the average course the development of resistance in a pop-
ulation. For sake of simplicity, we have assumed that the
development of resistance occurs in one step whereas
other authors [18] assume that the first mutation leads to
a resistant virus with impaired fitness and that the trans-
mission fitness will gradually improve over time. Once a
resistant virus with high fitness spreads in the population,
the relatively rare de novo development of resistance in
other people can be completely neglected because it is
out-weighted by the multiplication of the virus in the pop-
ulation. This is because therapeutic and prophylactic NI
use put pressure on the drug sensitive strain and favor the
spread of circulating NI resistant infections. Figure 4 dem-
onstrates this by comparing two scenarios: In scenario (a),
NI resistance develops de novo by treatment of cases
whereas in scenario (b) a NI resistant infection is intro-
duced 4 weeks later, but no de novo development of NI
resistance occurs. The resulting curves are nearly indistin-
guishable, indicating that once a resistant strain of high
transmissibility spreads in a population where there is a
lot of pressure on drug sensitive infection, any further de
novo development of resistance can be neglected. Our cal-
culations show that under widespread treatment, the NI
resistant strain spreads faster than the non-resistant one if
its fitness exceeds 81%. Prophylaxis will further increase
the pressure, leading to a quicker replacement of the drug
sensitive strain by the resistant one and increasing the
number of unsuccessfully treated patients (Fig. 3a). If the
fitness of the resistant virus is between 90 and 100%,
prophylaxis even increases the total number of cases (Figs.
2a–c) and hospitalizations (Fig. 3b), and we obtain the
counter-intuitive result that the work loss of those people
who receive prophylaxis may become larger than without
prophylaxis (Fig. 3c). Our simulations assume that a
small fraction of the population receives prophylaxis dur-
ing the whole course of the epidemic whereas individuals
are only advised to take prophylaxis for a maximum of six
weeks [19]. Another approach would be to split up the
group of first responders into subgroups who alternatively
receive prophylaxis, but the pressure on the drug sensitive
virus exerted by prophylaxis mainly depends on the
prophylaxis coverage and does not change much if differ-
ent people receive the drug at different times. Especially
for low prophylaxis coverage, our results should be rela-
tively robust in spite of this over-simplification. Our sim-
ulation results confirm other authors' findings which
indicate that the benefits of antiviral drug use to control
pandemic influenza may be reduced by NI resistance in
the virus [5,6]. Our model structure, assumptions and
parameter values differ from those reports: we used higher
values for R0 and for de novo development of NI resistance
than [5], but lower values than [6], and we used a wide
range of prophylaxis levels. In contrast to [5] and [6], we
found clear detrimental effects of any level of prophylaxis
if the relative fitness of the resistant strain is higher than
80% [20,21].
Conclusion
Surveillance of the appearance of NI resistant infections
and, most importantly, of the fitness of resistant strains
will be crucial to manage a pandemic wave. Uncontrolled
use of NI may do more harm than good. If a NI resistant
pandemic strain is reported to spread, the use of NI
should mainly be restricted to the treatment of cases
whereas prophylaxis must be reduced to an absolute min-
imum. If the fitness of the NI resistant pandemic strain is
high, any use of prophylaxis may increase the number of
hospitalizations and deaths in the population. Thus, pub-
lic health systems should diversify intervention strategies
by using prophylaxis in a very restrictive manner, by stock-
piling different types of antiviral drugs and by supple-
menting pharmaceutical interventions with social
distancing measures [22,23].
Comparison of de novo development of resistance and  importation of resistance Figure 4
Comparison of de novo development of resistance 
and importation of resistance. Prevalence of infection 
with drug sensitive (solid curves) and drug resistant infection 
(dashed curves) during a pandemic wave in a population of 
100,000 inhabitants. Scenario (a): a drug-sensitive infection is 
introduced on day 0; NI resistant infection develops de novo 
during antiviral treatment of cases throughout the simulation 
(treatment parameters see Figure 2; no prophylaxis; 100% fit-
ness of the resistant virus; black curves). Scenario (b): the 
importation of a drug sensitive infection on day 0 is followed 
by an importation of a NI resistant infection on day 28. 
Treatment is given as in scenario (a), but no de novo develop-
ment of resistance occurs within this scenario (grey curves). 
The resulting curves for Scenario (a) and (b) are nearly indis-
tinguishable.
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